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WHY DON'T DOCTORS & LA WYERS 
(STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT) GET THEIR 
ACT TOGETHER? 
Frances H. Miller* 
STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT: LAW AND MEDICINE IN THE MANAGED 
CARE ERA. By Peter D. Jacobson. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 2002. Pp. xvii, 296. $36. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Health care in America is an expensive, complicated, inefficient, 
tangled mess - everybody says so. Patients decry its complexity, 1 
health care executives bemoan its lack of coherence, 2 physicians plead 
for universal coverage to simplify their lives so they can just get on 
with taking care of patients, 3 and everyone complains about health 
care costs.4 The best health care in the world is theoretically available 
here, 5  but we deliver and pay for it in some of the world's worst ways.6 
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law; Professor of Health Care 
Management, Boston University School of Management; and Professor of Public Health, 
Boston University School of Public Health. A.B., Mount Holyoke College; J.D., Boston 
University School of Law. - Ed. Julia Conn, Boston University School of Law Class of 
2006, provided valuable research assistance. 
1. For a recent example, Medicare beneficiaries express confusion and frustration trying 
to distinguish among seventy-three competing Medicare-approved prescription-drug 
discount cards which became available on June 1, 2004. John Leland, 73 Options for 
Medicare Plan Fuel Chaos, Not Prescriptions, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2004, at Al. 
2. ROGER K. HOWE, WHERE HAVE WE FAILED?: A SYSTEMIC ANALYSIS OF U.S. 
HEALTH CARE (2002). 
3. Proposal of the Physicians' Working Group for Single-Payer National Health 
Insurance, 290 JAMA 798 (2003). 
4. James E. Dalen, Health Care in America: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 160 
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2573 (2000) (explaining why health care is more expensive in 
United States than in any other industrialized nation); Arnold M. Epstein et. al., Health 
Policy 2001 - A New Series, 344 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 673 (2001) (commenting on the 
excessive cost of health care in the United States). 
5. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, The State of the Union (Jan. 20, 2004), at http: 
//www,whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html (declaring that "America's 
health care [is] the best in the world"). But see Peter S. Hussey et al., How Does The Quality 
Of Care Compare Jn Five Countries?, HEALTH AFF., May-June 2004, at 89-99 (finding that 
contrary to the common "mantra" recited by U.S. policymakers and clinicians -
"Americans have the best medical care in the world" - recent empirical data on quality of 
healthcare worldwide rank United States in the "bottom quartile of industrialized 
countries"); Barbara Starfield, ls US Health Really the Best in the World?, 284 JAMA 483 
1295 
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Occam's razor ("Among competing hypotheses, favor the simplest 
one")7 is of little help here. There are no simple hypotheses -
everything seems to conspire to make a bad situation worse. 
Moreover, despite abundant speculation, no one has yet come up with 
the silver bullet for reform.8 So why don't doctors and lawyers, who 
consume health care themselves, get their act together and do 
something about it? 
Into this morass comes Peter D. Jacobson9 to offer cold comfort 
and a fiduciary band-aid with Strangers in the Night: Law and 
Medicine in the Managed Care Era, which illuminates why doctors and 
lawyers often have a hard time working with each other. The book 
promises to "explain . . .  how the legal system helps shape health care 
delivery and policy, explore . . .  new ways of looking at the 
relationship between law and medicine, and reflect . . .  on why it all 
matters" (book jacket). Professor Jacobson does manage to do that in 
the course of this purportedly limited examination of law and 
managed care, which he defines as "the generic name for the new 
health care delivery system . . .  characterized by large patient 
populations within integrated [i.e., combining financing and provisions 
of health services in one entity] delivery systems" (p. 7). By the end of 
the book, however, one is left with a depressed sense that things could 
get a whole lot worse for all of us, not just for doctors and lawyers, 
before we just might - with luck - restructure the whole shooting 
match into a more humane and efficient health care delivery system. 1 0  
(2000) (citing several recent studies indicating the "poor position of the United States in 
health worldwide"); but cf William J. Broad, U.S. Is Losing Its Dominance In the Sciences, 
N.Y. TIMES, May, 3 2004, at Al. 
6. For a particularly sinister take on that point, see David A. Hyman, Medicare Meets 
Mephistopheles, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1165 (2003). 
7. David A. Drachman, Occam's Razor, Geriatric Syndromes, and the Dizzy Patient, 132 
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 403 (2000). 
8. Some purport to have a silver bullet, but on close examination their ideas often turn 
out to be either impracticable because health care truly is "different" from other commercial 
products, or old chestnuts dressed up in trendy new rhetoric. See, e.g., Michael E. Porter & 
Elizabeth Olmsted Teisberg, Redefining Competition in Health Care, HAR V. Bus. REV., 
June 2004, at 65 (advocating competition at the level of specific diseases and health 
conditions rather than at the level of health-insurance plans, networks, providers and 
payors). 
9. Associate Professor, Department of Health Management & Policy, University of 
Michigan School of Public Health. 
10. This dismal thought was echoed in Jonathan Oberlander's conclusion to his recent 
book: "[A]fter thirty-seven years of policy innovations, political upheaval, changing 
economic circumstances, and a radically altered health care system, Medicare politics is back 
where it started [i.e., battling over the role of government v. markets in public policy]." 
JONATHAN OBERLANDER, THE POLITICAL LIFE OF MEDICARE 196 (2003); cf Rand E. 
Rosenblatt, The Four Ages of Health Law, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 155, 190-96 (2004); Hillary 
Rodham Clinton, Now Can We Talk About Health Care?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2004, 
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II. HISTORY 
Managed care is not the only battleground on which legal 
dilemmas involving doctors and lawyers have played out over the 
years, and Strangers in the Night traces these other controversies in 
brief historical arc to show that medical and legal professionals have 
sometimes worked in concert (i.e., on public health issues and ridding 
the profession of charlatans) (p. 33), whereas at other times they have 
been at swords' point (i.e., during malpractice lawsuits or antitrust 
litigation) (p. 28). Too often overlooked, they have also long worked 
in relative harmony on routine contract and other legal matters. 
Professor Jacobson points out that notwithstanding the ebb and flow 
of various legal problems over the years, relationships between the 
two professions had more or less stabilized by 1965, with clearly 
understood rules relating primarily to medical malpractice litigation. 
But then Medicare and Medicaid interjected a monumental federal 
presence into health care financing through the Social Security Act of 
1965,11 and that "changed everything" (p. 57). 
Strangers in the Night explores the way the relationship between 
law and medicine evolved as regulation designed to protect the 
government's substantial post-1965 financial investment in health care 
proliferated over the intervening years. The book shows how, in 
response to the massive influx of federal money into health-service 
reimbursement, accompanied by increasing government oversight 
over expenditures, the law's focus on health issues has shifted from its 
former preoccupation with liability questions to its present focus on 
issues more related to the functioning of a $1.7 trillion dollar business 
sector. 12 Professor Jacobson opines that law itself has "become a 
central force in the development of health care" in the process (p. 35). 
Both doctors and lawyers are inevitably involved in many of the 
controversies associated with managed care in general and Medicare 
and Medicaid in particular. These problems tend to play out primarily 
and often uncomfortably for doctors on legal and political turf, and 
therein lies much of the problem so far as cooperative problem solving 
is concerned. Doctors, educated to exercise control in medical 
environments, feel understandably ill-at-ease, vulnerable, and often 
resentful because lawyers control the rules of the legal games in which 
they are forced to participate. In fact, one especially aggrieved 
member of the American Medical Association's House of Delegates 
(Magazine), at 26 ("No, it's not 1994; it's 2004. And believe it or not, we have more problems 
today than we had back then."). 
11. The Social Security Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395 (West 2003). 
12 . Health Care Spending Reaches $1.6 Trillion in 2002, Center for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (Jan. 8, 2004), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/media/press/release.asp? 
Counter=935. 
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introduced a policy resolution for debate at the 2004 annual meeting 
stating that, notwithstanding the Hippocratic Oath, a physician's 
outright refusal to provide medical care for plaintiffs' lawyers and 
their spouses should not rise to the level of unethical conduct.13 
Although physicians usually have little problem dealing with the 
kinds of ambiguity and uncertainty inherent in medical practice that 
make patients anxious, doctors feel acutely at risk when unfamiliar 
legal processes and strange legal rules govern their own destinies.1 4 
The lawyer's stock answer of "that depends" when queried about what 
"reasonable" professional conduct or patient expectations means does 
not reassure them. This physician uneasiness in alien professional 
territory is not irrational given medical training encouraging them to 
take control of illness, and it can be downright disabling when doctors 
have a personal stake in the medical controversy at hand. Moreover, a 
plaintiff's allegation of carelessness regarding human life and health 
cuts far more deeply into a defendant-physician's psyche in medical 
malpractice litigation than does a garden-variety negligence claim 
alleging mere disregard of responsibilities relating to property. For 
these and many other reasons, doctors do not usually regard lawyers 
as their natural allies when it comes to problem solving, and lawyers 
often return the compliment. 
Although Professor Jacobson's introduction forthrightly professes 
a restricted scope for his book, don't let that deceive you. He states 
that his inquiry "is concerned with the cases brought by patients to 
recover damages after the failure to receive expected health benefits 
or after medical intervention went awry" (p. 1), but the scope of the 
book extends far beyond the cases themselves. Intentionally or not, it 
spotlights the inadequacies of our fragmented and competitive system 
for delivering health care in the course of proffering a way to balance 
the conflicting claims of individuals and societal groups for limited 
health care resources. 
III. COMPETITION IN HEALTH CARE 
For better or for worse, the United States has structured its health 
care delivery system on the competitive model. Once the command­
and-control regulatory measures the government passed in the 1970s 
as an exercise in fiscal self-preservation when Medicare and Medicaid 
13. Stephanie Francis Ward, Lawyer, Heal Thyself· AMA Proposal Advocates Refusing 
Medical Treatment to Plaintiffs Lawyers, ABA J. E-REPORT (June 11, 2004), http://www. 
abanet.org/journal/ereport/jnllama.html. Many physicians at the annual meeting denounced 
the proposal, and the sponsor asked that it be withdrawn. Doctor's Proposal on Lawyers 
Assailed, BOSTON GLOBE, June 14, 2004, at A4. 
14. See generally David Sclar & Michael Housman, Medical Malpractice and Physician 
Liability: Examining Alternatives to Defensive Medicine, HARV. HEALTH POL'Y REV., 
Spring 2003, at 1. 
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were enacted failed to tame rapidly escalating health care costs, 
competition was seen as the answer.1 5 Instead of performing according 
to the neoclassical paradigm to drive the price of health care services 
down and the quality up, however, health care competition has been 
famously unsuccessful in its attempt to rein in still relentlessly 
increasing costs. 16 Moreover, widely publicized medical-systems 
errors, 17 among other problems, testify to this country's many 
deficiencies in health care quality.18 Many physicians blame managed 
care for precipitating these deficiencies by circumscribing their clinical 
autonomy, but little evidence exists that patient care has deteriorated 
since the advent of managed care.19 
Many doctors have a hard time grappling with the fact that 
competition creates losers as well as winners, and doctors rebel against 
sometimes being on the losing end of things under managed care. 
Lawyers, on the other hand, have been trained to expect and accept 
the inevitability of winning and losing in their professional lives. In the 
words of Daniel Oliver, former Federal Trade Commission Chairman, 
part of the explanation for widespread physician dissatisfaction with 
managed care lies in the fact that "[a]ll of these years doctors have 
spent their political energies fighting socialized medicine. Now 
suddenly, they find they've been blind-sided by capitalism."2 0 
15. Victor R. Fuchs, The "Competition Revolution" in Health Care, HEALTH AFF., 
Summer 1988, at 5 (1988) (discussing how, during the 1980s, the government adopted the 
philosophy that "America's health sphere could position itself best for the future by 
employing market principles to allocate scarce resources"). 
16. Mark V. Pauly, Is Medical Care Different? Old Questions, New Answers, 13 J. 
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 227-237 (1988), reprinted in COMPETITION IN THE HEALTH CARE 
SECTOR: TEN YEARS LATER (Warren Greenberg ed., 1988). 
17. COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, INST. OF MEDICINE, TO ERR 
Is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000). 
18. See generally Perspectives on Medical Error: Reactions to the /OM Report, 27 AM. 
J.L. & MED. 145 (2001) (symposium issue dealing with health care quality). 
19. See, e.g., Bruce E. Landon et al., Comparison of Performance of Traditional 
Medicare vs. Medicare Managed Care, 291 JAMA 1744 (2004) (finding the difference in 
quality between fee-for-service Medicare and Medicare managed care to be similar in 
magnitude to that between competing health plans); Mary E. Seddon et al., Quality of 
Ambulatory Care After Myocardial Infarction Among Medicare Patients by Type of 
Insurance and Region, 111 AM. J. MED. 24, 32 (2001) (finding the quality of ambulatory care 
received by MCO and fee-for-service patients to be relatively comparable). 
20. Frances H. Miller, Antitrust Laws: Protecting Competition in an Era of Oversupply, 2 
MASS. MED. 23, 24 (1987) (quoting Commissioner Oliver's speech to the National Health 
Lawyers Association 1987 Conference on Antitrust in the Health Sector). 
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IV. MANAGED CARE AND THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME 
SECURITY ACT OF 1974 ("ERISA") 
The cost/quality tradeoff inherent in competition that produces 
winners and losers is actually nothing new in health care, although it 
used to be relatively hidden. Professor Jacobson traces the 
relationship between law and medicine through a great swath of 
history - the years 1800-1965 - reiterating his theme that the 
professions have not always been antagonistic to one another. As he 
rightly notes, the 1965 enactment of the Medicare and Medicaid 
programs21 injected a substantial government presence into the health 
care mix. It set the stage for expansion of managed care twenty-five 
years later by pumping vast new sums of money into the health sector 
and the government increased its oversight because it didn't want to 
pay for unnecessary services.22 In recent years, however, managed-care 
organizations ("MCOs") have been stung by the well-publicized 
subscriber backlash against their cost-containment efforts, most 
famously articulated by Helen Hunt's character's diatribe against her 
son's health insurer, which drew cheers from movie audiences in As 
Good as It Gets.23 As a result of this consumer backlash - and other 
factors24 - managed-care plans have now pulled back on their more 
aggressive cost-containment practices25 and scholars are writing ar­
ticles with titles like "The Death of Managed Care as We Know lt."26 
Cost pressures can hardly disappear, however, for an industry that 
is primarily financed by government and employers, and accounts for 
approximately - depending on the state of the economy at any given 
moment - fourteen percent of gross domestic product. 27 With 
managed care now in retreat and payors in revolt, these pressures will 
inevitably have to be addressed by other cost-containment 
mechanisms, such as the larger co-pays and deductibles that are 
21. See generally John Larkin Thompson, Medicare Play-by-Play: A Review of Theodore 
Marmor's The Politics of Medicare, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 475 (2000). 
22. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 506 
(4th ed. 2001). 
23. The exact quote is quite explicit: "Fucking HMO bastard pieces of shit!" As GOOD 
AS IT GETS (Columbiaffristar Studios 1997), available at http://us.imdb.com/title/tt0119822/ 
quotes. 
24. Mark Hall, The "Death" of Managed Care: A Regulatory Autopsy (forthcoming 
2004) (concluding that a mix of social, market, and legislative forces diluted cost­
containment forces in managed care around the turn of the twentieth century). 
25. See, e. g., James C. Robinson, The End of Managed Care, 285 JAMA 2622 (2001); 
Katherine Swartz, The Death of Managed Care as We Know It, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & 
L. 1201, 1204 (1999). 
26. Swartz, supra note 25. 
27. National Center for Health Statistics, Health Expenditures (2001), at http://www. 
cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/hexpense.htm. 
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increasingly common in today's health insurance plans.2 8 Whatever 
method is instituted to control costs, however, is surely guaranteed to 
generate a whole new round of legal controversies. These disputes 
may have to be adjudicated with slightly different rules, but once again 
they will force medical professionals onto legal turf to help resolve 
them. The trick will be for insurers to come up with cost containment 
mechanisms that come as close as possible to a win/win scenario for all 
relevant parties. Professor Jacobson believes he can take us in that 
direction with his fiduciary theories. 
Strangers in the Night uses the negligence cases set forth in the 
introduction to highlight the conflicting legal positions of otherwise 
similarly situated patients attempting to recover against the managed­
care health insurers who have denied them the purportedly necessary 
care advocated by their physicians. In Professor Jacobson's view, the 
marked differences in their litigation outcomes depended solely on 
whether they were subscribers to an BRISA-qualifying employer­
underwritten plan. He uses the artificial bifurcation of subscriber/ 
patient remedies these cases expose as a springboard to explore the 
many ways in which managed care has affected health care delivery 
over the past two decades. 
The BRISA conflict has arisen because Congress preempted state 
tort-law recovery (and state insurance regulation) against BRISA­
qualifying "employee welfare benefit plans" when it enacted BRISA 
to effectuate pension reform.29 In lieu of state tort recovery, Congress 
provided a federal remedy to employees claiming wrongful denial of 
benefits; that provision forces the employer to provide any benefits 
courts deem to have been wrongly withheld. 30 BRISA was passed in 
1972, a full decade before managed care began to take hold in 
comprehensive fashion in this country. Thus Congress almost certainly 
did not specifically intend its statutory prohibition against state-court 
tort recovery to apply to BRISA-qualifying health-insurance plans, 
those "employee welfare benefit" plans which just happen to be 
employer funded instead of underwritten by third-party insurers. 
Lower federal courts, increasingly unhappy with the anomaly of 
bifurcated remedies, have kept trying to find ways to circumvent pre­
emption and permit tort recovery against BRISA insurers in order to 
28. John K. Iglehart, Changing Health Insurance Trends, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 956 
(2002) (describing how insurance companies have responded to increasing health care costs 
by requiring consumers to "assume greater financial responsibility for the decisions they 
make when selecting insurance benefits and seeking medical treatment"). 
29. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 
1001-1461 (2004). 
30. Id. at § 1144(a) (providing that ERISA "supersede(s] any and all State laws insofar 
as they may . . .  relate to any employee benefit plan"). 
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permit recovery for their hapless insureds. 31 Congress has had ample 
opportunity to amend ERISA if it believed judicial interpretation of 
the statutory wording to be erroneous, but has not chosen to do so 
thus far. 32 Among the reasons is the fear that an onslaught of litigation 
against managed care plans will raise overall health care costs, which 
in turn will end up having to be reflected in higher Medicare and 
Medicaid payouts for health care. 
MCOs fly the banner of contract law (supported by ERISA) to 
uphold their coverage limitation decisions, while allegedly harmed 
subscriber/patients keep trying to challenge insurer decisions to deny 
them "necessary" care via tort liability. Subscriber/patients have on 
the whole been relatively unsuccessful in getting past ERISA's bar on 
state tort recovery, but some courts have been chipping away at 
ERISA's blanket immunity nonetheless. 33 Professor Jacobson believes 
that the fiduciary concept, imposing "duties on health care plans to 
ensure that medical decisions are not compromised by cost 
containment objectives" (p. 5), points to an easier way for us to 
extricate ourselves from this legal dilemma, and he builds a' plausible 
case to support his proposal. 
Some courts have shaped - some might say warped - the legal 
doctrine applying to MCOs in order to cope with ERISA-imposed 
legal constraints. These constraints are, in the exasperated words of 
Judge William Young, "tragic . . .  [and] cry out for relief," 34 because 
the federal legislation requires courts to treat similarly harmed 
patients insured by ERISA-qualifying plans differently from their 
non-ERISA-insured counterparts. 35 Furthermore, within the category 
31. See, e.g., Horvath v. Keystone Health Plan E., Inc., 333 F.3d 450, 463 n.11 (3d Cir. 
2003) (construing ERISA's preemption clause to exclude cases involving claims over 
treatment or quality of care); Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. 
granted sub nom, Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 462 (2003) (identifying plaintiffs 
claims as mixed eligibility and treatment decisions subject to Texas medical malpractice law 
permitting lawsuits against managed-care plans); Lazorko v. Pa. Hosp., 237 F.3d 242, 249 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (finding that decisions to deny treatment are subject to "claim(s] about the quality 
- and not the quantity - of benefits provided" and fall "outside the scope of ERISA's 
express preemption"). 
32. Perhaps Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion in the Supreme Court's most recent 
ERISA case, holding that ERISA pre-empts claims made under Texas statute imposing duty 
of care on HMOs, will prompt it to do so. See Aetna Health, 124 S. Ct. at 2503 (2004) ("I also 
join 'the rising judicial chorus urging that Congress and (this] Court revisit what is an unjust 
and increasingly tangled ERISA regime.' " (citing Difelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 
F.3d 442, 453 (3d Cir. 2003))). 
33. See, e.g., M. Gregg Bloche & David M. Studdert, A Quiet Revolution: Law as an 
Agent of Health System Change: A trilogy of Supreme Court Cases Reshaped the Regulatory 
Environment, But Law's Larger Influence Was Indirect, HEALTH AFF., Mar./ Apr. 2004, at 
24, 29, 39 (2004) (discussing the "dissolution of managed care's ERISA-based immunity 
from state regulation and tort liability"). 
34. Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 52 (D. Mass. 1997). 
35. See, e.g., Dahlia Schwartz, Breathing Lessons for the ER/SA Vacuum: Toward a 
Reconciliation of ER/SA 'S Competing Objectives in the Health Benefits Arena, 79 B.U. L. 
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of ERISA insureds courts make further distinctions; some patients 
seeking recovery after receiving poor-quality care may be permitted 
access to state court to press their tort claims, but those challenging 
benefit determinations before services are rendered are theoretically 
limited to the ERISA federal remedies. Professor Jacobson proposes 
to apply fiduciary responsibilities to managed-care insurers to cope 
with these anomalies. 
Unfortunately for his proposal, the Supreme Court has been busily 
undercutting this potential remedy with its recent decisions, at least 
for BRISA-qualifying plans. In the Court's 2000 opinion in Pegram v. 
Herdich,36 it held that an insurer's mixed treatment- /benefit-eligibility 
determinations do not qualify as just fiduciary decisions for purposes 
of triggering ERISA's more generous fiduciary remedies. 37 
Subscribers to non-ERISA plans are, however, still free to invoke 
fiduciary remedies in state court when they believe they have 
wrongfully been denied care. Although a national managed care 
patients' rights statute could effectively repeal ERISA's ban on state 
tort recovery, the events of 9/11 diverted Congressional attention from 
proposed patients' rights legislation which would have done just that. 
The proposed legislation had passed both houses but had not yet been 
reconciled in a final bill. 38 A federal managed-care patients' bill of 
rights may now be in danger of becoming an idea whose time has 
passed. Nonetheless, federal courts could conceivably still continue 
cutting back on the ERISA ban's effectiveness with increasingly 
narrow interpretations of the statutory language. 39 
Strangers in the Night makes an interesting foray into historical 
precursors to the current relationship between the judiciary and 
managed care by analogizing to the way the judges have reacted to 
other quickly emerging industries and to sweeping transformations of 
REV. 631, 638-39 (1999) (illustrating this discrepancy by showing how ERISA insurers can 
exempt themselves from liability under state laws requiring a "bare minimum of health 
benefits for employees" - such as mandatory coverage for pregnant women - whereas 
non-ERISA insurers cannot); The Supreme Court, 2001 Term - Leading Cases, 116 HARV. 
L. REV. 200, 421 (2002) (describing how ERISA's preemption provisions - which insulate 
ERISA-qualifying plans from state laws designed to protect patients - 'have triggered a 
"litigation bonanza"). 
36. 530 U.S. 211, 237 (2000) (holding that "mixed eligibility decisions by HMO 
physicians are not fiduciary decisions under ERISA"). 
37. In an opinion rendered in June 2004, the Court flatly held that "if an individual . . .  
could have brought his claim under ERISA § 502(a)(l)(B), and where there is no other 
independent legal duty that is implicated by a defendant's actions, then the individual's 
cause of action is completely pre-empted by ERISA § 502(a)(l)(B)." Aetna Health, 124 S. 
Ct. at 2496 (2004). 
38. S. 1052, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 2563, 107th Cong. (2001). 
39. See David L. Trueman, Will the Supreme Court Finally Eliminate ER/SA Pre­
emption?, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 427 (2004) (analyzing and commenting on two ERISA 
cases on which the Court heard oral argument this term). 
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existing industries. Jacobson shows that courts tend to modify their 
legal reasoning over time in a gradual process which at first protects 
the nascent industry by relying on contract law principles. That 
process gradually evolves, as the industry matures, into a more 
sophisticated jurisprudence more accommodating to injured plaintiffs. 
Courts do this by recognizing tort remedies as a way to impose 
accountability on these new ways of doing business (pp. 70-91). Taking 
the emergence of railroads in the nineteenth century along with the 
manufacturing transformations wrought by the introduction of mass 
production in the early twentieth century as his examples, Professor 
Jacobson analyzes the way courts have tended in the past to adapted 
contract and tort legal rules to fit the new economic realities. He 
suggests that today's judges might study their history in order to think 
more creatively about the possibilities for fiduciary remedies. If they 
do, they might achieve "a more sustainable legal regime for 
challenging policy conflicts created by managed care" (p. 31). 
After examining legal doctrine "at the boundary of tort and 
contract" for lay readers, Professor Jacobson fleshes out his reader's 
understanding of those sometimes-slippery concepts in the context of 
litigation against managed-care organizations. These entities, like the 
railroads and mass production of prior centuries, offer "something 
new" because they integrate health care financing with service 
delivery. He also does a crisp, workmanlike job exploring the nuances 
of a complex set of relationships among, and interests held by, the 
various current stakeholders in the health care enterprise (p. 218). 
Strangers in the Night takes on the task of figuring out what the 
judicial and legislative responses to managed care actually mean to 
doctors and patients as two of these major stakeholders. According to 
Professor Jacobson, "[b]y not interfering with managed care's 
financial incentives, the courts have subordinated the physician­
patient relationship to the dictates of the marketplace" (p. 2). The 
decided cases show that many, if not most, patients find it difficult, if 
not impossible, to hold MCOs themselves accountable for the quality 
of care they so prominently advertise and finance. Physicians have 
achieved no greater success in their attempts to challenge the MCO 
cost-containment policies that they allege compromise patient well­
being, though one might well question the assertions of these 
stakeholders that quality of care has really been compromised in 
specific cases. 4 0  The author's general point that courts have not been 
particularly friendly to these lawsuits, in at least some small part 
because they fail to appreciate the complexities of modern health care 
delivery, rings true nonetheless. 
40. See, e.g., Wickline v. California, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (landmark 
non-ERISA case finding no negligence despite allegation that state Medicaid's cost­
containment program compromised plaintiff's medical care). 
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Professor Jacobson finds this judicial deference to the power of 
managed care ironic, and offers the fiduciary-duty approach of the 
final part of his book as an alternative strategy for reconciling the 
tension between law and medicine in the era of managed (or "post­
managed") care. The unifying fiduciary concepts attempt to reconcile 
the individual patient's "desires" for medical services with all patients' 
"need" for care. The cost/quality dilemma again, but this time at a 
higher and better-informed level. The book revisits the torts/contracts 
debate permeating prior chapters, and concludes that "neither ... is 
adequate for balancing resource allocation tradeoffs" (p. 4). Professor 
Jacobson acknowledges the "messiness" of his fairly amorphous 
fiduciary standard for resolving managed care disputes, but points out 
that its elastic contours are well-suited to the gradual emergence of 
judicial doctrine. 
Professor Jacobson's prescription for balancing the competing 
claims of individual patients and societal groups to health care 
resources by applying fiduciary concepts is a creative but complicated 
halfway measure. Regrettably, it would probably require intensive 
judicial oversight at the outset until well-recognized standards 
develop. While Jacobson believes courts are up to that task, he may be 
overly optimistic about the enthusiasm of the judiciary for becoming 
deeply embroiled in mixed questions of economics and medicine on a 
regular basis. Nonetheless, he believes that "policymakers need not 
choose between polarized options of unfettered physician 
autonomy .. . versus strict cost containment" (p. 1). Instead, they can 
utilize his fiduciary approach to "maintain . . . managed care's ability 
to control costs, but in a way that is far more deferential to physician 
autonomy and restores the primacy of the physician-patient 
relationship" (p. 1). 
That certainly sounds like motherhood and apple pie to the 
medical profession, but the author then sets about explaining why the 
rest of us shouldn't consider it just another slice of pie-in-the-sky. His 
analyses of the nature of the medical and legal professions and the 
differences between them are on point, and help to explain why they 
have not done a better job of working together on better resolving 
managed care issues (pp. 9-17). The section on 'shared values is 
somewhat less successful and a bit strained in parts (pp. 17-22). For 
example, his sixth "shared value," that both doctors and lawyers are 
solely responsible for the quality of services they provide (p. 22), is 
simply not so. The whole point of many patient lawsuits against MCOs 
is the allegation that MCOs can be equally responsible with 
doctors or even solely responsible for the poor quality of care some 
subscriber/patients receive.41 
41. See id. 
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Professor Jacobson fails to take account of one of the biggest 
reasons for the managed-care industry's increased scrutiny of 
physician decisionmaking: doctors deliver a service that is by and large 
subsidized by third parties (employers and the government) who take 
a keen interest in ensuring that providers deliver value for money. 
Doctors complain about disproportionate oversight, especially as 
compared with lawyers, but they fail to appreciate that their patients' 
normal incentives to economize on purchasing medical services have 
been blunted by third-party coverage. On balance, however, Professor 
Jacobson mounts a good argument for the professions to reconcile 
their remaining differences and help policymakers assist them to get 
on with the task of delivering a reasonable quality of care to patients 
writ large at a reasonable cost. 
Strangers in the Night could be influential in further judicial 
evolution of the law related to managed care, whether or not Congress 
ever enacts a managed-care patients' bill of rights or the Supreme 
Court ever resolves the ERISA issue in all its complexities. For 
everyone seeking to understand how we got ourselves into our present 
- and seemingly endless - difficulties with managed care, and for 
anyone interested in seeking a way for us to get out of them short of 
restructuring the whole health sector, this book can serve as a useful 
and important roadmap. Whether doctors and lawyers can work 
together to help "make things better"42 is still an open question. 
42. Senator Claude Pepper often used that phrase to describe what we all should 
be doing to advance the interests of society. See, e.g., Speech, Jan. 1, 1950, available 
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